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State v. National Banks: The Battle Over Examination Fees
I. INTRODUCTION
The battle over disparate levels of examination fees paid by
national banks and state banks is fought between the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the regulator of national
banks, and the fifty state banking supervisors, the regulators of
state-chartered banks.' The central issue is the proper way to fund
the examination of state banks by their federal supervisors-the
Federal Reserve Board (the Fed) or the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC)? In July of 2001, the OCC
submitted a proposal to Congress to reform the current fee system
for bank examinations. '  After previous failed attempts to
restructure the current fee system, the OCC's most recent
proposal takes a substantially different approach to reform
Previous proposals have imposed new federal fees on state-
chartered banks' or barred the use of national banks' funds for
1. See, e.g., Louis Jacobson, Killing Bank; Exam Fees, Again, 33 NA1'L J. 1176
(2001) (describing the current examination fee system, criticism of the fee structure
by the OCC, proposals to charge new fees, and opposition to change from the state
charter).
2. See id. A similar fight exists in the credit union industry. See infra note 17.
3. CO PROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, REFORMING THE FUNDING OF B, Nu
SUPERVISION (July 2001), at http:I'-,w.Toce.treas.goviftplreleaef201-67c.pdf (last
visited Feb. 6,2001).
4. See infra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., infra note 52 and accompanying text (discussing President Bush's
budget proposal to impose new fees on state-chartered banks). Comptroller of the
Currency, John D. Hawke, Jr., has publicly expressed his opinion that imposing new
fees on state-chartered banks is "not a politically viable approach." John D. Havke,
Jr., Consolidation in the Financial Services Industry, Remarks before the University
of North Carolina School of Law Center for Banking and Finance (Apr. 5, 2051), in
OCC QJ., Sept. 2001, at 38, 40, available at http:U,wv,,.occ.treas.govtqjloj20-3.pdf
(last visited Feb. 6, 2002) [hereinafter Hawke, Consolidation].
While [requiring the Fed and the FDIC to charge for examinations
of state banks] is in many vays the most straightforvard, since it
would end the subsidization of federal supervision for state banks
by national banks and restore a healthier competition to the dual
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federal regulation of state-chartered banks.6 However, the July
2001 proposal by the OCC suggests the FDIC insurance fund be
used to pay for the supervision of all federal and state banks.7 As
this proposal coincides with a serious effort to reform the deposit
insurance system,8 raising the fees issue as a part of deposit
insurance reform may be a good strategy.
This Note will begin with an abbreviated description of the
current examination fee system9 and the specific characteristic of
the dual banking system that causes so much of this conflict-
federal examination of state banks.' The next section will
examine previous proposals to change the current system,"
followed by an analysis of the OCC's July 2001 proposal. 2 This
Note will conclude by examining the likelihood of success of the
OCC's proposal for reforming the funding of bank supervision. 3
banking system, one has to confront the political reality that
Congress is not likely to impose such a new charge on state banks.
John D. Hawke, Jr., Deposit Insurance Reform and the Cost of Bank Supervision,
Remarks before the Exchequer Club (Dec. 20, 2000), [2000-2001 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 92-661, at 97,618 (Mar. 16, 2001) [hereinafter Hawke,
Deposit Insurance Reform].
6. See, e.g., Rob Garver, Hawke Parries Leach, Says System is Unfair, AM.
BANKER, Dec. 21, 2000, at 1 (describing a suggestion by the OCC that national banks
receive rebates for the portion of their insurance premiums which would be used for
examination fees).
7. See COMPTROLLER OFTHE CURRENCY, supra note 3.
8. See William F. Kroener, III, Implementation of Selected GLBA Provisions
and Other Topics of Current Interest: The FDIC Perspective, WL SF06 ALI-ABA
321, 365 (Aug. 17, 2000) (describing the issues involved in the FDIC's comprehensive
review of the deposit insurance system); see also Deposit Insurance Reform: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. and Consumer Credit of the House Comm. on Fin.
Serv., 107th Cong. 1 (2001) (statement of Donald E. Powell, Chairman, Fed. Deposit
Ins. Corp.) (stating that although the system is not in need of a "radical overhaul,"
there are flaws that should be corrected by new legislation), available at
http://www.house.gov/financialservices/101701po.pdf (Oct. 17, 2000) [hereinafter
Deposit Insurance Reform]. For a discussion of why the deposit insurance system
needs reform, see generally Nancy Coppola, Note, Increased Federal Deposit
Insurance Coverage: At What Cost?, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 429 (2002).
9. See infra notes 14-35 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 36-50 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 51-67 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 68-154 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 155-157 and accompanying text.
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H. THE CURRENT EXAMINATION FEE SYSTEM
In the United States' dual system of banking, financial
institutions have the choice between a national or state charter.14
Banks electing a national charter are subject to federal regulation
and supervision by the OCC. 5 State-chartered banks, however,
have a dual form of regulation: they are regulated under both state
and federal law. State-chartered banks that become members of
the Federal Reserve system (state "'member" banks) are regulated
by the Fed, 6 and all other state banks (state "nonmember" banks)
are regulated by the FDIC.17 In addition, both member and
14. See Heidi Mandanis Schooner. Recent Challenges to the Persistent Dual
Banking System, 41 ST. LOUIS U. LJ. 263 (1996) (providing a brief history of the dual
banking system).
15. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 26, 481 (2000), see also COMPTROLLER OFTHE CURRENCY,
ABOUT THE OCC (describing the functions of the OCC), at httpJwvw,.oce.treas.gov
aboutocc.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2002) [hereinafter ABCoT THE OCC]. The OCC
was established in 1863 as a bureau of the U.S. Department of the Treasury. Id. It
has authority to examine banks, approve or deny applications for new banks, take
action against banks that do not comply with regulations or that engage in unsound
banking practices, and issue rules and regulations applicable to banks. Id.
16. 12 U.S.C. § 325 (2000). As a condition of membership in the Federal Reserve
System, state member banks are subject to examination by the Fed. Id. The Federal
Reserve, founded in 1913 to provide a safe, flexible, and stable financial system, has
four general functions today: (1) conducting the monetary policy of the United
States, (2) supervising and regulating state-chartered banks that are members of the
Federal Reserve system, bank holding companies, and foreign bank offices in the
United States, (3) maintaining stability in the nation's financial system, and
(4) providing the United States government, the public, financial institutions, and
foreign official institutions with certain financial services. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF
THE FED. RESERVE Sys., THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: PURPOSE AND FC.NkIIONS
1 (Sth ed. 1994), available at http:ll,w:w.federalreserve.govipfipdflfrspurp.pdf (last
visited Feb. 6, 2002). By law, all federal banks are members of the Federal Re'erve.
Id. at 14. State banks may choose to become members, provided they meet
requirements set by the Board of Governors of the Fed. Id. All member banks are
required to purchase stock in their regional Federal Reserve Bank. Id.
17. 12 U.S.C. § 1820(b)(2)(A) (2000). The FDIC was created in 1933 to bring
order to the banking system after the Great Depression. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP.,
FDIC: SYNEmOL OF CONFIDENCE, at http:llv,-ww,.fdic.govlaboutilearnmmbolI
index.html (last modified July 27, 1999) (last visited Feb. 17, 202). Today, the FDIC
insures deposits in U.S. banks and savings and loan associations, arranges resolutions
for failing institutions, monitors the insurance fund, and is the primary federal
regulator for state-chartered nonmember banks. Id.; see also FED. DEPOSIT INS.
CORP., FDIC: SYMBOL OF CONFIDENCE-SUPERVISION (describing the FDIC's role
as a regulator of state non-member banks), at http:lvww,.fdic.govlaboutleam
symbolfstructure.html# supervision (last modified July 27, 1999) (last visited Feb. 17,
2002).
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nonmember state banks are subject to primary regulation by their
respective state banking departments."8
Under the current system, there are three means by which
banks pay for the cost of their regulation. First, all federal and
state banks, regardless of membership in the Federal Reserve
System, must maintain a certain amount of reserves with the Fed.20
The Fed uses interest it earns on those reserves to pay for its
Credit unions also have a dual-chartering system. See generally NAT'L
CREDIT UNION ADMIN., HISTORY OF CREDIT UNIONS AND NCUA, at
http://www.ncua.gov/ about/history.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2002). The National
Credit Union Administration (NCUA) was created in 1970 to charter and supervise
federal credit unions. Id.; see also 12 U.S.C. § 1752a(a) (2000) (establishing the
NCUA). In North Carolina, the Credit Union Division of the North Carolina
Department of Commerce charters and examines state credit unions. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 54-109.10 (1999). All state-chartered credit unions that are federally insured
are also subject to yearly exams by NCUA. 12 U.S.C. § 1784(a) (2000). Deposits of
insured credit unions are insured up to $100,000 by the National Credit Union Share
Insurance Fund (NCUSIF), which was capitalized by credit unions. See NAT'L
CREDIT UNION ADMIN., HISTORY OF CREDIT UNIONS AND NCUA, at
http://www.ncua.gov/about/history.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2002). All insured credit
unions are required to keep one percent of their deposits on reserve in non-interest
bearing accounts with NCUA. 12 C.F.R. § 741.4(c) (2001). The State Employees'
Credit Union (SECU) in North Carolina is the nation's largest state-chartered
natural person credit union. Credit Union Division, NC Dept. of Commerce, Credit
Unions, at http://www.commerce.state.nc.us/culliblhtmilcuabout.asp (last visited Feb.
6, 2002). With over $7 billion in assets, it is required to keep on deposit with NCUA
more than $70 million in non-interest bearing reserves. STATE EMPLOYEES' CREDIT
UNION, 2001 ANNUAL REPORT 8 (2001), available at http://www.ncsecu.org/
2001AnnualRpt.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2002). Large state credit unions such as
SECU might argue that it is unfair for federal credit unions, which are regulated by
NCUA, to get the benefit of NCUA's interest income from its investments of state
credit union reserves.
18. See 12 U.S.C. § 1820(d)(3) (regarding state examinations of nonmember
banks); 12 U.S.C. § 326 (regarding state examinations of member banks).
Many state banking departments are accredited by the Conference of State
Bank Supervisors (CSBS). CSBS, WHAT CSBS DOES, at http://www.csbs.org/
membership/membership.asp (last visited Feb. 4, 2002). CSBS was founded in 1902
and provides training to examiners and their staff. CSBS, WHAT IS CSBS, at
http://www.csbs.org/membership/ membership.asp (last visited Feb. 4,2002).
19. Adam Wasch, Examinations: Financial Shadow Group Recommends Banks
Pay Fees for Supervision, Exams, BNA BANKING DAILY, May 9, 2000, at D3.
20. 12 U.S.C. § 461(b)(2)(A)-(C) (2000). Reserve requirements are important to
monetary policy because they provide a stable, predictable demand for aggregate
reserves. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYSTEM, supra note 16, at 6.
The Fed can manipulate the reserve ratios to control short-term interest rates. id.
For the reserve ratios as amended on October 19, 2001, see Reserve Requirements of
Depository Institutions, 66 Fed. Reg. 53,076 (Oct. 19, 2001) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 204).
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examinations of state member banks?' Additionally, banks
insured by the FDIC finance the FDIC's deposit insurance fund
through required premium payments n  Interest on those assets
fund the FDIC's examinations of state nonmember banks?
Finally, all banks pay examination fees to their primary regulator:
national banks pay fees to the OCC, and state banks pay fees to
their state banking departments. 4
As the primary regulator of national banks, the OCC
examines all national banks annually. - To fund its operations, the
OCC charges fees for those examinations." Examination fees
charged by the OCC totaled approximately $383 million in 2000.27
State banking departments, the primary regulators of state-
chartered banks, also charge examination fees. However, state
banks pay fewer fees because state supervisors only have to
examine each state bank every other year.:' In addition to
regulation by the state banking departments, federal regulators
examine state banks once every other year; however, neither the
FDIC nor the Fed assesses fees for the examination services they
provide to state banks."
21. Wasch, supra note 19, at D3.
22. 12 U.S.C. § 1815(d)(1)(A)-(B) (2000). The insurance funds promote stability
and confidence in the nation's banks. FED. DEPOSIT Ims. CORP., DEWOSIT
INSURANCE: LNSURANCE FUNDS & ASSESSMENTS, at http:llwww.fdic.govi
deposit/insuranceindex.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2002). Currently, however, over
ninety-two percent of all FDIC-insured institutions pay no premiums because the
Bank Insurance Fund (BIF) is already at its mandated reserve level. Deposit
Insurance Reform, supra note S.
23. Wasch, supra note 19, at D3.
24. Id.
25. "The OCC examines national banks pursuant to authority conferred by 12
U.S.C. § 481 and the requirements of 12 U.S.C, § 1820(d). The OCC is required to
conduct a full-scope, on-site examination of every national bank at least once during
each 12-month period." 12 C.F.R. § 4.6 (2001).
26. 12 C.F.R. § 8.2 (2001); see ABOUT THE OCC, supra note 15. In addition, the
OCC charges fees for processing applications. Id. Income from the OCC's
investments also provides some revenue to fund its operations. Id.
27. COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 3. at 3.
28. Jacobson, supra note 1, at 1176. In 2000, state banks paid about S1b9 million
in fees to their respective state supervisors. COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY. supra
note 3, at 3.
29. See 12 U.S.C. § 1820(d)(3) (2000).
30. SHADow FINANCIAL REGULATORY COMMITrEE. AMERICAN ENTERPRISE
INSTITUTE, STATEMENT" No. 161: PROPOSAL ON FULL COST PRICING OF SUPERvISORY
AND EXAMINATION SERVqCES BY THE FEDERAL BANKING AGENCIES, at
20021 467
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The FDIC does not charge examination fees to state banks
because examinations are funded entirely by revenues earned on
its deposit insurance funds, which have been financed by premium
payments from insured banks.3 In 2000, $568 million of these
funds were used to supervise state nonmember banks.32 Similarly,
the Fed does not charge for examinations of state banks under its
jurisdiction.33 Instead, the Fed finances the cost of supervising
state member banks through revenues earned on its asset portfolio
consisting of investments in government securities.34 The Fed
spent about $300 million to supervise state member banks in
2000.
31
The total cost to the FDIC and the Fed of supervising state
banks in 2000 was nearly $1 billion; however, state banks were not
charged fees for these services. 6 Both the FDIC and the Fed have
authority to impose fees on state banks for the examinations they
provide.37 However, they choose to continue to conduct the
examinations completely free of charge because they have enough
money in their budgets to pay for the examinations . 3' At the end
of 2000, the FDIC had $31.0 billion in assets in the Banking
Insurance Fund (BIF) and $10.9 billion in the Savings Association
Insurance Fund (SAIF).39 Both funds currently exceed the
http://www.aei.org/shdw/shdwl61.htm (May 8, 2000) (on file with the N. C. Banking
Institute) [hereinafter SHADOW PROPOSAL].
31. COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 3, at 4-5. But see Deposit
Insurance Reform, supra note 8 (explaining that many banks today are not required
to pay any insurance premiums).
32. COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 3, at 4-5. An additional $70
million was used for the supervision of state-chartered thrift institutions. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. The FDIC spent $568 million to supervise state banks, and the Fed spent
about $300 million. Id.; see also supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text (discussing
the costs of federal regulation of state banks).
37. 12 U.S.C. § 1820(e)(1) (2000) (covering the FDIC); 12 U.S.C. § 326 (2000)
(covering the Fed).
38. Jacobson, supra note 1, at 1176; see OFFICE OF FIN. AND INS. SERV., MICH.
DEPT. OF CONSUMER AND INDUS. SERV., 1998 ANNUAL REPORT 14 (1999), available
at http://www.cis.state.mi.us/ofis/pubs/reports/dfi-yrly/1998/fib98_6.pdf (last visited
Feb. 6,2002).
39. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., THE FDIC QUARTERLY BANKING PROFILE,
FOURTH QUARTER 2000, at 15 (2000), available at http://www2.fdic.gov/qbp/2000dec/
qbp.pdf (last visited Feb. 6,2002).
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required statutory reserve ratios," so the FDIC has excess funds
available to finance state bank examinations.
The Fed is also experiencing a surplus in its regulatory
budget4 In 2000, the Fed earned $33 billion in interest income on
reserves held by national banks and state member banks.42 The
majority of the Fed's net income is remitted to the U.S. Treasury
each year, and subsequently passed through to taxpayers.O3
Therefore, any money that the Fed spends on regulating state
member banks is money that would have otherwise benefited
taxpayers."4
The result of the decision of the FDIC and the Fed not to
charge state banks for their examination services is an indirect
subsidy of state-chartered banks.45 According to Comptroller of
40. The designated reserve ratio for each insurance fund is 1.25 percent of
estimated insured deposits, or a higher percentage if the FDIC determines it is
necessary for a given year. 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(2)(A)(iv) (2000). As of June 30,
2001, the reserve ratio for the BIF was 1.33 percent. Memorandum from Arthur J.
Murton, Director, FDIC Division of Insurance, to Board of Directors of the FDIC 1
(Oct, 19, 2001) (first of two memoranda, discussing BIF Assessment Rates for the
First Semiannual Assessment Period of 2002), available at http:h'Vv,-vw.fdic.gov1
depositlinsurancelrisklBi002_.01.pdf. The reserve ratio for the SAIF was 1.40
percent on June 30. Memorandum from Arthur J. Murton, Director, FDIC Division
of Insurance, to Board of Directors of the FDIC 1 (Oct, 19, 2001) (second of two
memoranda, discussing SAIF Assessment Rates for the First Semiannual Assessment
Period of 2002), available at http:l vwv.fdic.govldeposittinsurancefrislSAIF200 2jO1.
pdf. Since 1996, the BIF alone has averaged more than $1.6 billion a year in earning3,
not including premium amounts paid into the fund. COMPTROLLER OF THE
CURRENCY, supra note 3, at S.
41. See 2000 BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SySTEM.t ANN. REP. 321
(shovng $4.1 billion transferred to surplus), available at http:4(www.,federalreserve.
govIboarddocsCRptCongresannualOOlarOO.pdf (last visited Feb. 6,2002).
42. kd Of that amount, $32.7 billion was interest earned on U.S. government and
federal agency securities, $269 million vas interest on foreign investments, and S23
million was interest on loans to depository institutions. Id.
43. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYSTEMi, THE STRUCT'URE OF
THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, at http:lw,'ww.federalreserve.govlpub
frseriesfFRSERI3.htm (last modified July 26, 2001) (last visited Feb. 17, 2002); 200
BD. OF GoVERNoRs OF THE FED. RESERVE SYSTEi ANN. REP. 321 (showing S25.3
billion in payments to the Treasury), available at http:flw',wv.federalreserve.ov
boarddocsfRptCongresslannual00lar00.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2002).
44. See 2000 BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYSTEMi ANN. REP. 321
(showing operating expenses of $2.9 billion), available at http:f;www.federlreerve.
goviboarddocsIRptCongresslannual00Iar00.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2002); see also
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 3, at 4; Hav:he. Deposit Insurance
Reform, supra note 5; SHADOW PROPOSAL, supra note 30.
45. See Garver, supra note 6, at 1.
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the Currency John D. Hawke, Jr., this system places a
disproportionate burden on national banks to fund the supervision
of state banks.46 Because national banks hold a greater share of
U.S. bank deposits than state banks,47 they necessarily contribute
more to the FDIC insurance funds and the federal reserves.4 8 A
portion of payments by national banks to the FDIC (in the form of
insurance premiums) and the Fed (through non-interest bearing
reserves) is used to pay for state bank supervisions, but none of the
payments are distributed back to the national banks: national
banks bear nearly the full cost of their supervision in the form of
fees to the OCC. 49 The resulting subsidy to state banks is, in the
view of the OCC and national banks, an unjustified federal policy
and a "fundamental flaw in our system of bank supervision."5"
III. FAILED ATrEMPTS TO CHARGE NEW FEES
Failed proposals to raise revenue by imposing new fees on
state banks were included in seven Clinton Administration budget
plans.5 In his Fiscal Year 2002 budget plan, President Bush also
46. Id.; COMPTROLLER OFTHE CURRENCY, supra note 3, at 3.
47. As of June 30, 2001, FDIC data showed that nationally-chartered banks held
$1.3 trillion in FDIC insured deposits, while state member banks held $482 billion,
and state nonmember banks held $681 billion. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., THE FDIC
QUARTERLY BANKING PROFILE, SECOND QUARTER 2001, at 18 (2001), available at
http://www2.fdic.gov/qbp/2001jun/qbp.pdf (last visited Feb. 17,2002).
48. For example, calculations by the OCC show that national bank contributions
from 1990 to 2000 represented fifty-five percent of the FDIC's BIF. COMPTROLLER
OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 3, at 4. According to OCC data, FDIC-supervised
nonmember banks contributed thirty percent and Fed-supervised member banks
contributed fifteen percent. Id.
49. COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 3, at 4.
50. Id. at 1; see generally Hawke, Deposit Insurance Reform, supra note 5
(discussing the perceived unfairness in the current examination fee system).
51. See Jacobson, supra note 1, at 1176; see also OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET,
FISCAL YEAR 2001 BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 404, 416 (estimating increased
revenues of $92 million to the FDIC and $78 million to the Treasury), available at
http://w3.access.gpo.gov/usbudget/fy2001/pdf/budget.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2002);
OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 2001 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES 86
(proposing to require the FDIC and the Fed to recover their costs of supervising state
banks as a revenue raising mechanism), available at http://w3.access.gpo.gov/
usbudget/fy2001/pdf/spec.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2002).
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proposed to charge fees to state-charted banks to finance their
federal examinations by the FDIC and the Fed. -
The House of Representatives Committee on Financial
Services opposed the plan in President Bush's budget proposal
that would have imposed fees on state banks and bank holding
companies. 3 The House Committee noted that state banks
already pay "significant" fees for examinations conducted by their
state banking supervisors. 4  Small state banks would be
disproportionately affected by the imposition of new fees, which
could result in negative effects on small businesses and farmers,
who typically rely on smaller state-chartered banks for their credit
needs. " The House Committee also pointed out that sufficient
5Z See OFFICE OF NIGNIT. AND BUDGET, Fisc,,iL YEAR 20102 BUDGET OF THE U.S.
GoERNmrir 232-33 (estimating revenues of $92 million to the FDIC and $70
million to the Treasury), available at http:IAA'.vhitehouw.govombhudget6
fy2002lbudget.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2002); see also OFFICE Or M6%MT. AND ButLtE7,
FIscAL YEAR 2002 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES 45-46. 55 (propo'ing to raise revenue
by requiring the FDIC and the Fed to impose examination fees on state banks),
available at httpIAvT:Tv.whitehouse.govlombfbudgetlfvfU2spec.pdf (last ,isited Feb.
6, 2002). However, no such proposal is included in President Bush's fiscal year 2093
budget plan. See OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 2003 BUDGET OF
THE U.S. GoVERNMENT, available at http:/tiwv,,w-.whitehouse.govlombfbudget
fy2003lpdflbudget.pdf (last visited Feb. 17,2002).
53. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMLM. ON FIN. SERV., 107TH CoNcG., VIEWS AND
ESTMIATES ON MATTERS To BE SET FORTH IN THE CONCURPREN-T RESOLUTI0N ON
THE BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2002, at 8-9 (Comm. Print 2001). available at
http:/Ilww ,Tw.house.govlflnancialservicesfbudget02.pdf (Mar. 8. 2001) (last visited Feb.
17,2002).
54. Id
55. See id. at 9. In September of 2001, the OCC also published a notice of
proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register to establish a minimum supervision fee
for national banks. See Assessment of Fees, 66 Fed. Reg. 4S.983 (Sept. 25, 2001) (to
be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 8). Smaller banks, with less than S2 million in assets
would be charged a flat fee of $10,000. which represents a sixty-four percent increase
in fees. Nicole Duran, OCC Plans $10K Fee to End Smallest Banks' Bargain Rate,
AM. BANKER, Sept. 26, 2001, at 15. Karen Thomas, of Independent Community
Bankers of America, argues that the fee increase has a disproportionate impact on
small banks. Id; Richard Cowen, National Banks: OCC Proposes Change in Fee
Assessment with Largest Impact on Smallest Institutions, BNA BAN RiNG DAILN, Sept.
26, 2001, at D3. However, an OCC spokesperson contends that larger banks
currently subsidize the cost of examining smaller, riskier institutions; thus, the flat
rate is necessary to make the system more fair. Duran, supra, at 15; Cowen. supra, at
D3.
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funds already exist to pay for federal examinations of state banks
without assessing additional fees.56
Because the imposition of additional fees on state banks
would eliminate the cost incentive of electing a state charter,
institutions might choose the national charter in order to avoid
double examination fees.57 In the House Committee's view, this
creates an unfair advantage for the national charter that could
potentially undermine the nation's dual banking system." For
these reasons, the House Committee opposed the examination fee
proposal as "unnecessary and burdensome.
59
The Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs also opposed the Bush Administration's inclusion of state
bank examination fees in its budget proposal.6" Like the House
Committee, the Senate Committee expressed concern that
imposing new fees would create an inequity for state banks since
they already pay fees to their state regulators, and that such a
system would be especially detrimental to smaller banks. 61 The
Senate Committee emphasized the importance of maintaining a
balanced regulatory system in which both state and national banks
pay fees only to their chartering agency.6
The proposal was also met with opposition from trade
groups contesting the examination fee requirements, including the
56. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON FIN. SERV., supra note 53, at 8-9; supra notes
38-42 and accompanying text (discussing the budget surpluses of the Fed and the
FDIC).
57. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON FIN. SERV., supra note 53, at 9.
58. See idt For a discussion of the advantages and purposes of the dual banking
system, see infra notes 104-107 and accompanying text.
59. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON FIN. SERV., supra note 53, at 9. Very similar
justifications for opposing new fees were given for President Clinton's previous seven
proposals. See, e.g., STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING AND FINANCIAL SERVICES,
105TH CONG., FY2000 BUDGET VIEWS (1999) (opposing the proposal because (1)
state examiners already charge fees; (2) the BIF is fully capitalized; (3) the cost of
credit would increase; and (4) the dual banking system would be threatened),
available at http://www.house.govffinancialservices/fy2000bv.htm (last visited Feb. 6,
2002).
60. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS,
107TH CONG., FY2002 BUDGET VIEWS AND ESTIMATES (2001), available at http://
banking.senate.gov/corresp/vw-estO2.htm (Mar. 16, 2001) (last visited Feb. 17, 2002).
61. See id.
62. See id. Presently, both types of banks pay examination fees to their
chartering agencies (the OCC or state banking commission) as well as deposit
premiums to cover operating expenses of the FDIC. Id.
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Conference of State Bank Supervisors (CSBS) '3 which wrote an
anti-exam fee letter to the United States Senate expressing
disapproval of the Bush Administration's budget proposal." The
letter requested Senate support for a budget amendment drafted
by Senators Michael Enzi (R-WY) and Thomas Carper (D-DE)
which would strike the proposal to impose new fees from the
budget.6 The CSBS argued that charging state banks for federal
supervision would negatively impact the dual banking system by
moving toward a completely federal regulatory scheme, with a few
large banks dominating the market."h The Enzi amendment was
passed by voice vote on April 6, 2001, successfully erasing the
examination fees proposal from the fiscal year 2002 budget'
IV. ANALYSIS OF PROPOSAL BY THE OCC
A. The OCC's Proposal
In July of 2001, the OCC announced a unique proposal to
change the current system: examinations of all banks should be
funded by payments from the FDIC's insurance funds directly to
63. See Jacobson, supra note 1, at 1176. For a discussion of CSBS and their
representation of state banks, see supra note 18. Other trade groups that objected to
the proposal for new fees included the American Bankers A'sociation, America's
Community Bankers, Independent Community Bankers of America, and the
Financial Services Roundtable. See Memorandum from American Bankers
Association. et al., to Members of the U.S. Senate. http:'&,,w.acbankers.org
government/seriptslgovernmentyiew.asp?ID=557 (Apr. 3, 2ti1) (last visited Feb. 17,
2002).
64. See Financial Institutions: Bush Budget Provides More Funding for OFHEO
Supervision of Fannie, Freddie, BNA B.ANIaNG DAILY, Apr. 10. 2001, at D2;
Memorandum from American Bankers Association, et al, to Members of the U.S.
Senate, supra note 63.
65. See Memorandum from American Bankers Association, et al., to Members of
the U.S. Senate, supra note 63.
66. See Jacobson, supra note 1, at 1176. John Ryan, senior %ice president for
policy at CSBS, said in other nations, where the regulatory system of banks is purely
federal, the market is dominated by only a few large banks. ld.
67. News Release, Senator Mike Enzi, Enzi Budget Amendment Eliminates
Bank Fees, (Apr. 6, 2001) http:U/enzi.senate.govibankfees.htm (last visited Feb. 17,
2002). Senator Enzi and supporters of the amendment said the effect of the new fees
would have been a federal tax on state-chartered banks, v:hich already pay state
banldng departments for examinations. Id. "'This is a double charge,' he said.
'Charging the fees would only hamper initiatives the states have made to improve
cost effectiveness. Competition maximizes efficiency and is a good thing even in a
regulatory world."' Id.
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the OCC and state supervisors.68 Under the OCC's proposal, the
FDIC, OCC, and state bank supervisors would work together to
develop a formula for allocating the insurance funds.69 To
determine the formula, they would consider current funding levels,
the number of institutions and total amount of assets being
supervised, and the financial condition and growth of the
institutions." Payments would come only from investment
earnings of the insurance funds, never from the funds' principal.7
If earnings of the insurance funds were ever insufficient to cover
allocations to all the supervisors, payments to each supervisor
would be reduced pro rata.7" Individual supervisory agencies
would still be authorized to impose additional fees on their banks
to meet unusual demands. "
The OCC predicts that all banks would enjoy benefits from
such a modification of the examination system.74 In particular, the
OCC's plan would eliminate the subsidy of state bank
examinations by federal bank examiners, without imposing any
new costs on state banks or jeopardizing the deposit insurance
funds." According to the OCC, investment income from assets in
the Bank Insurance Fund are more than adequate to cover the
supervisory expenses of the OCC, the FDIC and the fifty state
supervisors.76 The OCC argues that bank examinations would be
more effective, since all supervisors would have sufficient funds
allocated for examinations.77 Additionally, the OCC insists its plan
would facilitate the ultimate goal of deposit insurance reform-to
68. See COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 3, at 7-8; see also Hawke,
Consolidation, supra note 5 (examining the possibility of a system that uses FDIC
funds to pay for both state and national bank exams). The proposal excludes the Fed
from receiving payments from the insurance funds. See COMPTROLLER OF THE
CURRENCY, supra note 3, at 7-8.
69. See COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 3, at 7.
70. See id.
71. See id.
7Z See id.
73. See id. at 8.
74. Id.
75. See COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 3, at 8.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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allocate the costs and benefits of deposit insurance equitably-and
"revitalize" the dual banking system."3
The CSBS, representing state banking departments," does
not agree that the OCC's proposal is in the best interest of the
banking system, especially as far as state banks are concerned." '
The group has expressed its opposition to the OCC's proposal,"'
and has been critical of the OCC for using the deposit insurance
reform issue as a means to force consideration of its "controversial
plan."' 2
Supporters of the current system have previously argued
that the purpose of the current system is not to subsidize state
banks, but to provide a more effective and efficient examination
system through cooperation between federal and state supervisory
agencies.3 Their primary argument against changing the fee
78. Id. "It would revitalize the dual banking svstem to move bayond the current
charter price competition and recapture the elements of the dual banking system that
have made it vital to the fabric of our nation's banking system: creativity, efficiency
and healthy competition." Id.
79. For example, the North Carolina Banking Commissioner's position is
reflected in the stance taken by CSBS. Telephone Interview v,.ith David Hanson,
Bank Analyst, North Carolina Banking Commission (Oct. 1, 2J1)). The Office of the
Commissioner of Banks has written letters to North Carolina Congressional
representatives supporting CSBS's position. Id.
80. See Deposit Insurance Hearing: Comptroller Injects New Controvcrsy into
FDIC's Deposit Insurance Reform Plan, EXAMINER (Conf. of State Bank
Supervisors, Washington, D.C.), July 27, 2001, available at http:IV.wwv.csbs.orgipr1
examinerlexaminer.asp?x=30-01&s=1 [hereinafter Deposit Insurance Hearing] (last
visited Feb. 17,2002).
81. Neil Milner, president of CSBS. said that the OCCs proposal "federalizes
state banking supervision. It undermines the federal safety net for depositors. It
does nothing to enhance quality supervision and may even discourage administrative
efficiency." Deposit Insurance Hearing, supra note SO.
82. Id.
83. See Garver, supra note 6 ("[Tlhe perception of inequity [is] the result of a
decision by the OCC to market the national charter to banks as a one-stop regulatory
shop, making it impossible for the agency to share responsibilities %vith the Fed and
the FDIC."); Oklahoma Commissioner Says OCC Has a "Strange" Strategy,
EX.AMNER (Conf. of State Bank Supervisors, Washington, D.C.), Sept. 22, 2080
(quoting Letter from Mick Thompson, Oklahoma Bank Commissioner, to John
Bodnar, Deputy Comptroller of the Currency, Southvest District (Sept. 19, 2UD))
("'[S]tate coordination and cooperation with the FDIC and Fed is one of the great
innovations of the state banking system.'"), at http/%,.-v,v.csbs.orgfpr~examinert
examiner.asp?x=37-00&s=1 (last visited Feb. 14, 2002); Exam Fees are "DOA," So
OCC Tries New Approach, EXAMINER (Conf. of State Bank Supervisors,
Washington. D.C.), Dec. 22, 2000 (noting the lower costs that result from sharing
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structure has been that imposing new fees would reduce the cost-
efficiency of state bank exams, a quality that has long been
publicized by CSBS and state supervisors as an advantage of the
state banking system.' 4 Historically, the OCC has responded to
this argument by insisting that the state banking system is not a
model of efficiency, 5 since an examination by two agencies, when
one agency could perform the same function at a lower cost, is an
inefficient system. 6 However, the OCC's new proposal averts that
argument by taking a more straightforward approach: elimination
of the subsidy to state banks by providing equal funding to
national banks.8 7
B. Criticisms of the Current System
Comptroller Hawke calls for a restructuring of the current
examination fee structure as part of the FDIC's review of the
deposit insurance system.8 The OCC identifies four flaws in the
current examination system: unfairness, distortion of the dual
banking system, compromise to safety and soundness, and
inconsistency with the goals of deposit insurance reform.89
regulatory responsibility between two agencies), at http:lwww.csbs.org/prlexaminerl
examiner.asp?x=49-00&s=1 (last visited Feb. 14,2002).
84. See Rob Blackwell, State, Federal Regulators Fight Over Charter Flips, AM.
BANKER, June 19, 2000, at 4 (quoting West Virginia banking commissioner Sharon
Bias as saying that "two sets of eyes are better than one" and "our system of two
regulators is safer"); Conference of State Bank Supervisors, VA. STATE BANKER (Va.
Bureau of Financial Institutions), Winter 2001, at 3 (explaining that state-chartered
banks choose state charters because regulation is "efficient, responsive, accessible,
and cost-effective"), available at http:lwww.state.va.us/scc/divisionlbanking/news/
sb.win0l.pdf (last visited Feb. 14,2002).
85. Comptroller Hawke has stated that "efficiency has nothing to do with it."
Hawke, Deposit Insurance Reform, supra note 5.
86. Id.
87. See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
88. See Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Comptroller
Hawke Urges FDIC Reforms to End Inequitable Treatment of National Banks (Dec.
20, 2000), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2000-104.txt (last visited
Feb. 17, 2002). For a thorough study of deposit insurance reform, see generally
Coppola, supra note 8.
89. COMPTROLLER OFThE CURRENCY, supra note 3, at 2.
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1. Unfairness
The OCC criticizes the current system for its unfairness to
national banks and taxpayers." Unlike the FDIC and the Fed, the
OCC does not have revenue sufficient to cover exam costs, so
national banks must pay for the cost of their examinations.9 ' In
fact, the law requires that the OCC impose a fee on national banks
equivalent to their regulatory costs.' Not only must national
banks pay for their own mandatory examinations, but they are also
required to contribute to the FDIC's insurance funds, which
subsidize state examinations.' Although state banks also make
premium payments to the insurance fund, state banks are not
required to expend any of their own funds for federal examination
fees.' The OCC argues the result is an involuntary subsidy by
national banks for the benefit of state nonmember banks."5
Under the system proposed by the OCC, all banks would
be put on an equal footing regarding examination fees." With
payments being made from the insurance fund to the primary bank
regulators, every bank would receive the same benefit from the
insurance premiums that have built up the fund." Barring any
unusual circumstances, no bank would pay examination fees,
90. See id. at 3-4.
91. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text (discussing funding mechanisms
of the FDIC and the Fed).
92. 12 U.S.C. § 482 (2000) ("Such assessments, fees, and other charges shall ba
set to meet the Comptroller's expenses in carrying out authorized activities."); DC.
Speaks: Hawke" Unequal Fees Undermine U.S. Charter, AM. BAxNKER, Dec. 29, 2109,
at I [hereinafter D.C. Speaks].
93. See COMfrROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 3, at 3-4. By the OCC's
calculations, fifty-five percent of the BIF consists of contributions from national
banks; thus, fifty-five cents of every dollar used by the FDIC to supervise state
nonmember commercial banks is a subsidy from national banks. Id.
94. Ld. at 4.
95. Id.; see also Viewpoints of Select Regulators on Deposit Insurance Reform:
Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Fitz. Inst. aid Consumer Credit, Comm. on
Fin. Sen., 107th Cong. (July 26,2001) (statement of John D. Hawke, Jr., Comptroller
of the Currency) (maintaining that more than half of the funds spent by the FDIC to
supervise state nonmember banks were contributions from national banks in the
form of insurance premiums), available at http:lvwv.occ.treas.goaiftplreleasef2I l-
67a.txt [hereinafter Hawke Testimony].
96. See COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 3, at 7 (proposing to uSe
the FDIC insurance fund to cover the examination costs of state and national banks).
97. See id.
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which would completely eliminate any fee disparity found in the
current system.98
Even though the OCC's plan eliminates the fee disparity,
the plan does not address the fact that state banks would still be
receiving more federally funded examinations than national
banks.99 Money from the insurance funds would cover state
regulators' costs of examining state banks."0 However, the FDIC
and the Fed would continue to provide biennial examinations to
state banks free of charge.' Since the OCC views these free
examinations as the source of the unfairness,"°2 the proposal fails
to address this alleged fault in the current system.
2. Distortion of the Dual Banking System
Comptroller *Hawke is also concerned that the present
examination fee framework undermines the dual banking
system.' '3 Generally, state and national bank regulators agree that
the advantage of a dual system is its furtherance of healthy
competition among banks and bank regulators."°  The cost of
98. Id. If unusual circumstances placed higher demands on an agency, that
agency might charge "supplemental assessments." Id. at 8.
99. See id. at 7-8.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 3, at 1.
103. See id. at 5 (stating if many banks were to elect a state charter in order to save
examination fees, the national bank charter could suffer significantly, which would
undermine the dual banking system).
104. See, e.g., D.C. Speaks, supra note 92 (citing the growth of negotiable order of
withdrawal (NOW) accounts in the 1970s as an example of healthy competition
between the state and national charters); Chairman of the Federal Reserve Alan
Greenspan, Remarks before the Annual Meeting and Conference of the Conference
of State Bank Supervisors (May 2, 1998) (referring to state banks' creation of
demand deposits as an example of innovation that results from competition between
charters), http://www.federalreserve.govboarddocs/speeches/1998/19980502.htm (last
visited Feb. 6, 2002) [hereinafter Our Banking History]; Kansas Office of the State
Bank Commissioner, Advantages of a Kansas State Chartered Bank (stating that the
Kansas Bank Commissioner supports the dual banking system because it furthers
market competitiveness), at http://www.osbckansas.org/AbouttheOSBC/advantge.
html (last visited Feb. 14, 2002). But see Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, The
Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking System, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 677, 680
(1988) ("[W]e not only fail to find any evidence of the regulatory competition that
the supporters of the dual banking system envision, we find that such competition
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supervision, the quality of examinations, the scope of permissible
activities, and supervisory responsiveness are all issues that banks
might consider in choosing their charter."' Therefore, the OCC
and the state regulators presumably compete to be the best in all
of these areas, so as to attract the most banks to their charter."'
However, if there were not a dual banking system, there would be
less motivation for the regulator to increase efficiency, provide
effective exams, or be responsive to banks requests and
concerns.
10 7
Over the past several decades, Congress has increased the
responsibility of federal supervisors in their examination of banks
in order to ensure the protection of consumers."' ; Because the
OCC must charge for its examinations of national banks,"' these
increased supervisory requirements translate into an increase in
examination fees that national banks must pay."' Of course, the
costs of supervising state banks also increases, since the FDIC and
the Fed also have increased supervisory roles."' However, since
states do not pay for their biennial federal examinations, the gap
between examination costs to national banks and state banks has
increased"':
Many state bank commissioners, recognizing the cost
incentive of being a state-chartered bank, advertise their lower
would harm the economy if it did exist under the current regulatory infrastructure in
banking.").
105. See COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 3, at 5.
106. See Schooner, supra note 14, at 266 ("Banks' ability to choose their regulator,
arguably, pits federal and state agencies against one another, forcing them to alter
regulatory practices and procedures to enhance their ability to attract and retain
bank charters."); Our Banking History, supra note 104 (arguing that the dual banking
system protects against "overzealousness" and -arbitrary and capricious" policies).
107. See Our Banking History, supra note 104 (voicing concerns about "the
possibility that a single regulator would inevitably become rigid and insensitive to the
needs of the marketplace").
108. See COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 3. at 5.
109. About the OCC, supra note 26.
110. See COMPTROLLER OFTHE CURRENCY, supra note 3, at 5.
l1L See id.
112. See Ud According to the OCC, state banks today pay less than half the
examination costs charged to national banks. Id. OCC figures show that a $500
million national bank pays an average of $113,000 per year, Vhile a state bank of
comparable size pays only $43,000 in examination fees. Id.
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fees to attract new state charters."' The OCC acknowledges that
lower fees are an advantage of the state charter and argues that
the disparity could undermine the national charter and the
purpose of the dual banking system to ensure efficiency and
healthy competition." 4 Furthermore, if many national banks were
to convert to state charters, the FDIC and the Fed would have to
spend an increasing amount on state bank supervision, which
essentially increases the costs to taxpayers and national banks."5
In short, the OCC implies that the amount charged for
examinations is the chief consideration to banks in choosing a
charter. 6 The CSBS does not agree; it believes banks base their
decision on other factors, such as the responsiveness they get from
a primary regulator that understands the local economy." 7 If the
choice between a national and state charter really centers on the
cost of supervision, the OCC's proposal to eliminate this factor
seems reasonable. According to the 2000 annual report of the
Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC),
there are 2,301 national banks compared with 996 state member
banks and 5,171 state nonmember banks."' However, OCC-
supervised institutions held approximately fifty-six percent of the
total assets, while Fed-supervised institutions held about twenty-
six percent and FDIC-supervised institutions held roughly
113. See, e.g., Ben Jackson, Charter-Shift Movement in Oklahoma, AM. BANKER,
Dec. 15, 2000, at 5 (stating that nine Oklahoma banks converted from national to
state charters in 2000 because they were "promised lower exam fees"); Laura K.
Thompson, Lower Fees Spur Charter Swap for Farmers of Md., AM. BANKER, Jan. 2,
2001, at 4 (identifying a Maryland bank's primary reason for converting from a
federal to state charter as the expense of national charter examinations). In 2000,
Alabama's banking commissioner admitted to using the lower fees of the state
charter to entice SouthTrust Corporation to convert from a national bank to an
Alabama state-chartered bank. Blackwell, supra note 84, at 4. Neil Milner, president
of the CSBS, defended the practice of using the fee comparison to solicit national
banks to switch to a state charter. Id.
114. COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 3, at 5.
115. Id.
116. See id.
117. Telephone Interview with Neil Milner, President and CEO, Conference of
State Bank Supervisors (Oct. 1, 2001) [hereinafter Milner Interview].
118. FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, 2000 ANNUAL REPORT 27 (2001),
available at http://www.ffiec.gov/LC/annrpt00.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2002). The
FFIEC is a formal interagency body, which prescribes uniform standards for federal
examination of financial institutions, pursuant to Title X of the Financial Institutions
Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3641.
Id. at 1.
480 [Vol. 6
CHARTERS AND FEES
eighteen percent."9 One possible inference from this data is that
larger institutions choose the national charter, and smaller banks
choose the state charter. Perhaps the smaller institutions choose
the state charter primarily because they cannot afford the fees
charged by the OCC.2 If so, the OCC's proposal seems like a fair
way to eliminate the focus on the cost of supervision, without
negatively affecting those smaller institutions.
On the other hand, another reasonable hypothesis based on
the FFIEC data is that smaller institutions benefit from the other
aspects advertised by state banking departments: more
responsiveness to local concerns and the advantage of being
examined by two different supervisors." If that is the case, the
OCC's proposal vill not likely attract any more banks to the
national charter. In fact, even though state supervisors would
benefit financially from the OCC's proposal, CSBS opposes the
plan because of its potential to undermine the dual banking system
by eliminating the state charter." According to Neil Milner,
president and CEO of CSBS, federal funding leads to federal
rules, which leads to a "monolithic regulatory system, which
undermines initiative and creativity."'" The fear is not that all
state banks will convert to the national charter; rather, CSBS is
concerned that the choice itself vill eventually be eliminated. 2
3. Compromise to Safety and Soundness
The OCC also argues that the current fee structure
compromises bank safety and soundness by reducing the
availabilit, of supervisory resources when they are most likely to
be needed." The OCC cites the many bank failures during the
119. See id at 27. The FFIEC data indicates that national banks held $3.34 trillion
in assets, while state member banks held $1.54 trillion and state nonmember banks
held $1.08 trillion. Id.
120. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
121. MJ~lner Interview, supra note 117. Milner indicated that banks that chos-- a
state charter do so primarily because (1) they like having a primary regulator that
understands the local economy, and (2) "two sets of eyes are better than one." Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 3, at 6.
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late 1980s and early 1990s as an illustration. 26 During that period
of time, each bank failure resulted in reduced income to the OCC
at a time when the need to prevent future failures caused
examination costs to rise. 127  The result was an increase in
examination fees to all national banks when they could least afford
it, resulting in the loss of even more national banks.'28 In times of
crisis, the current system inevitably places the burden of managing
problem banks on the better managed national financial
institutions; all banks are either subject to increased examination
fees or decreased supervision, even if they are sound institutions.'29
Furthermore, according to the OCC, the present system
negatively affects bank supervision even when there are no
economic problems.3 ' In both the national and state banking
systems, assets are concentrated in a few large banks.'3 ' As a
result, the loss of just one large bank (because of charter
126. See id.
127. Id.
12& Id. Presumably, many national banks who could not afford their supervisory
costs failed or converted to state charters, whose increased examination fees were
paid for by the FDIC and the Fed.
129. Id.
130. See id.
131. COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 3, at 6; see also The Failure of
Superior Bank, FSB, Hinsdale, Illinois: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. (Sept. 11, 2001) (prepared
testimony of Karen Shaw Petrou, Managing Partner, Federal Financial Analytics,
Inc.) [hereinafter Petrou Testimony] ("The consolidation in the banking industry
means that the OCC [is] increasingly dependent on a few very large institutions for
the bulk of [its] revenue.").
At year-end 2000, Bank of America had the greatest amount of assets of all
FDIC-insured nationally-chartered banks, with over $584 billion. Fed. Deposit Ins.
Corp., Statistics on Depository Institutions Report: Assets and Liabilities, at
http://www3.fdic.gov/sdi/main.asp (last visited Feb. 6, 2001). The total assets for all
insured national banks were $3.41 trillion. Id. Among the insured banks chartered
by the North Carolina Banking Commission, Branch Banking and Trust (BB&T) had
the greatest amount of assets, with nearly $47 billion at year-end 2000. Id. The total
assets for all insured North Carolina-chartered banks was approximately $91 billion.
Id. The FDIC's Statistics on Depository Institutions (SCI) database allows the user
to create detailed financial reports with customized peer groups of FDIC-insured
institutions. To obtain this data, the author generated a report on October 28, 2001,
by selecting the following peer groups: (Column 1) Standard Peer Group--Federally
chartered-National; (Column 2) Single Institution-FDIC Certification # 3510
(Bank of America); (Column 3) Standard Peer Group-State chartered-NC;
(Column 4) Single Institution-FDIC Certification # 9846 (Branch Banking and
Trust). The author chose a report date of December 31, 2000, and selected the
Assets and Liabilities report option.
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conversion, failure, or merger) requires the supervisory agency to
adjust its budget, either by raising examination fees or by reducing
the amount of money it spends on supervision.' "- If the agency
raises examination fees, some banks may not be able to afford
them. But if it tries to operate on a smaller budget, examinations
will be less thorough and less likely to detect problems with
financial security.' By eliminating the need to charge
examination fees, neither the state nor the national banking
systems will face this threat to the security of their institutions.
4. Inconsistent with Deposit Insurance Reform
Lastly, the OCC points to goals of deposit insurance reform
as a justification for revising the current examination fee system.'-
The FDIC has recently completed a major study of the deposit
insurance system to make certain that consumers maintain
confidence in the nation's banks. 3 As part of deposit insurance
reforms recommended in this study, the FDIC seeks to eliminate
subsidies to riskier banks by lifting restrictions on risk-based
pricing.'36 The OCC maintains that eliminating the examination
fee disparity is as necessary to deposit insurance reform as
elimination of the risk subsidy.'37 Because contributions to the
insurance fund by national banks are partially used to subsidize
state bank examinations, their premiums do not accurately reflect
the risk of loss they present.' By distributing a portion of the
revenue generated from their insurance premiums back to national
banks, the OCC says its proposal would eliminate this subsidy to
132. COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 3, at 6. For example, if North
Carolina lost BB&T to the national charter, it would lose close to fifty percent of its
revenue. See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., supra note 131.
133. See COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 3, at 6 (arguing the loss of
a large bank could have a crippling effect on an agency's ability to provide quality
supervision).
134. See id at 6-7. For more detailed information regarding deposit insurance
reform, see generally Coppola, supra note S.
135. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., KEEPING THE PROMISE: RECOMIENDATIONS
FOR DEPOSIT LNSURANCE REFORM, at i, available at http:i/www.fdie.gov'depositI
insurancelinitiativeldirecommendations.pdf (Apr. 5, 2001) (last visited Feb. 17, 2002).
136. Id.; see supra notes 22, 40 (briefly describing the current restrictions on risk-
based premiums).
137. See COMfTROLLER OF THE CURRENC', supra note 3, at 6-7.
133. Id. at 6.
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state banks and further the underlying reform goal: equitable
distribution of the costs and benefits of deposit insurance."'
Because the OCC views the FDIC's free examination of
state banks as an inequitable distribution of earnings on the
insurance funds to which all banks contribute, the OCC presents
this issue as a fundamental aspect of deposit insurance reform. 41
During recent Congressional hearings, Comptroller Hawke
remarked on the OCC's views of deposit insurance reform. 4 ' In a
statement before the House of Representatives Subcommittee on
Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit, Comptroller Hawke
expressed the OCC's concern over flaws in the deposit insurance
system, and supported insurance reform measures consistent with
those proposed by the FDIC in April 2001.142 He also introduced
to the Subcommittee members the OCC's most recent proposal for
changing the examination fee system.'43  By expressing
encouragement of the FDIC's reform efforts,'" the OCC may be
hoping to get cooperation on exam fee reform from the FDIC and
Congressional members supporting the FDIC's position. But
whether raising the fees issue as part of deposit insurance reform
will prove successful remains to be seen. Although a few
individuals have supported considering the OCC's proposal as part
of deposit insurance reform,'45 FDIC Chairman Donald Powell did
not address the OCC's proposal in his recent testimony before the
House of Representatives.1 46 Even though Chairman Powell did
not oppose the OCC's plan, he offered no indication that he would
139. See id. at 6-7.
140. See id. at 7.
141. See Hawke Testimony, supra note 95.
142. See id. (supporting the FDIC's recommendations to merge the insurance
funds, establish more risk-based premiums, eliminate the current reserve ratio and
allow the FDIC to establish a required range and give rebates; but opposing the
FDIC's proposal to increase the insurance coverage level to reflect its real value); see
also FED. DEPOSIT INS. CoRp., supra note 135, at 6-21 (describing the FDIC's
recommendations for reform measures).
143. See Hawke Testimony, supra note 95.
144. See Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, supra note 88.
145. See, e.g., Failure of Superior Bank: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on
Banking Housing and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. (Oct. 16, 2001) (prepared
testimony of Dr. George C. Kaufman, Loyola University Chicago); Petrou
Testimony, supra note 131.
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advocate the proposal as part of reforming the deposit insurance
system.'47
Unlike the numerous budget proposals that attempted to
impose new fees on state banks, the OCC's proposal may be met
with less criticism from Congress. When both the House
Committee on Financial Services and the Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs voiced their disapproval of
the budget provisions that would have restructured the current fee
structure, their main concern was that the imposition of new fees
would be harmful to many small state banks.' Without a
requirement that state banks pay for federal regulations, this
concern no longer eists.
If Congress does consider the OCC's proposal as part of
overhauling deposit insurance, the OCC will have to convince
Congress that the plan is feasible. Karen Shaw Petrou, managing
partner of the Washington-based consulting firm Federal Financial
Analytics, Inc., has identified some potential problems with using
the insurance fund to defray the cost of examinations by the OCC
and state supervisors. 9 Payments to the OCC and state banking
departments would decrease the funds available to insure failed
institutions.' If the FDIC's resources were diminished too much,
all banks could see a rapid increase in premiums."' Since one of
the FDIC's reform goals is to avoid volatile premiums, a plan that
increases the possibility of unexpected premium increases would
be undesirable. 2 The FDIC also seeks the discretion to adjust the
reserve ratio and the ability to charge appropriately for risk, even
during economic good times."3 Under such a modified system,
more banks would be subject to premium payments, and
identifying the portion of premium payments to return to each
supervisor could be more difficult."
147. See id.
148. See STAFF OF HOUSE CO,,M. ON FIN. SERV., supra note 53, at 8-9; SENAxTE
CoNLi. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, supra note 60.
149. Petrou Testimony, supra note 131.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See Deposit Insurance Reform, supra note S.
153. See id.
154. Petrou Testimony, supra note 131.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The OCC's proposal adds another controversial element to
the already complex debate over deposit insurance reform.
Convincing Congress that examination costs should be defrayed by
the deposit insurance fund, rather than some other source, will be
an arduous challenge.'55 An even bigger hurdle, however, may be
persuading Congress that the current system is not the best one. 56
Even though the OCC's most recent proposal varies significantly
from those previously rejected by Congress, the bottom line is that
Congress continues to permit an indirect subsidy in favor of state
banks.'57 The OCC's proposal would move closer towards
eliminating that subsidy, and Congress may be unlikely to go that
far.
CONNIE EDWARDS JOSEY
155. See supra notes 149-154 and accompanying text (examining potential
problems of using the insurance fund to defray the cost of bank examinations by the
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